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Abstract
We analyse stated preference data over nursing jobs collected from two dif-
ferent discrete choice experiments: a multi-profile case best-worst scaling
experiment (BWS) prompting selection of the best and worst among alter-
native jobs, and a profile case BWS wherein the respondents choose the
best and worst job attributes. The latter allows identification of additional
utility parameters and is believed to be cognitively easier. Results suggest
that respondents place greater value on pecuniary over non-pecuniary gains
in the multi-profile case. There is little evidence that this discrepancy is
induced by the extra cognitive burden of processing several profiles at once
in the multi-profile case. We offer thoughts on other likely mechanisms.
JEL classification: C23, C25, C81, J44
Key words: discrete choice experiment, preference elicitation, rank-ordered
data, latent class logit, best-worst scaling, maximum-difference model
Highlights:
• We compare preferences on nursing jobs elicited by profile and multi-
profile case DCEs.
• The paper is the first to contrast the two types of DCEs using monetary
and nonmonetary attributes.
• Preferences are comparable across the DCEs but only for non-monetary
attributes.
• Respondents value salary gains relatively more in the multi-profile
DCEs.
• The evidence suggests that this discrepancy is not due to the variation
in cognitive difficulty.
1 Introduction
Discrete choice experiments (DCEs) have become a common data collection method
in health economics. A recent review by de Bekker-Grob et al. (2012) finds that the
number of published DCE studies in health economics has increased from 34 in 1990-
2000 to 114 in 2001-2008. By far the most well-known type of DCE is a traditional
DCE which prompts the respondent to choose her best, i.e. most preferred, profile
from a set of multiple profiles differentiated by the attributes of interest. An extension
to this method, the multi-profile case best-worst scaling (BWS), has become popular
in recent years. By asking the respondent for both the best and worst among several
differentiated profiles, it elicit more preference information with minimal additional
burden (Flynn, 2010a; Flynn, 2010b).
Recently, another type of DCE has received a lot of attention in the choice modelling
literature. In this alternative DCE, known as the profile case best-worst scaling (BWS),
the respondent faces one hypothetical profile, and states its best and worst aspects.
Within health economics, Flynn et al. (2007) is the primary article that kindled interest
in the profile case method, and Marti (2012) discusses subsequent applications. In the
present study, we provide empirical comparisons of stated preferences elicited by these
two different methods: the profile case BWS and the multi-profile case BWS (Flynn
2010b). For ease of presentation and clarity, we refer to these experiments as single
profile and multi-profile cases respectively.
We know of only two other papers, Potoglou et al. (2011) and Flynn et al. (2013),
that study the comparability of preferences estimated using single profile and multi-
profile case data. Findings in these quality-of-life studies suggest that preferences are
structurally similar across methods. However, the life situations depicted in these
papers include only non-monetary attributes. In contrast, our profiles include both
monetary (salary) and non-monetary attributes, much as discrete alternatives of interest
in a typical economic analysis. As we show below, the inclusion of monetary attributes
alters the comparability of the estimated preferences substantially.
The respondents in our experiments consist of current students and recent graduates
of the Bachelor of Nursing programs at two universities in New South Wales, Australia,
and profiles describe typical entry-level nursing positions.1 Each person participated
in both single and multi-profile case BWS experiments during 2009-2010. A choice
1More information on the survey is provided in Section 2; also a detailed description is available in
Kenny et al. (2012).
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set for the multi-profile experiment includes 3 entry-level nursing jobs described by
salary and 11 non-salary characteristics. By asking for both best and worst choices, we
obtain a full ranking of the alternatives. A person’s preferences over the job attributes
are elicited to the extent that between-job variations in these attributes influence her
preferences over jobs. In the single profile case experiment, each scenario is a particular
nursing job described by salary and 11 non-monetary attributes set at specific levels.
A respondent examines the job, and states its best and worst attributes. In effect,
the person’s preferences over attributes are elicited at a more primitive level. In the
survey, each respondent completes 8 different single profile case scenarios followed by 8
different multi-profile case scenarios.
The users of the single profile case BWS (Flynn et al., 2007; Flynn 2010a and 2010b;
Marti 2012) have emphasised two advantages of this method over the multi-profile case
method. First, the single profile method imposes less of a cognitive burden on the
respondent. People may find it easier to understand and complete a single profile
case experiment, because each scenario requires evaluation of only one hypothetical
profile. This potential advantage may be especially relevant to health economics, where
DCE applications often involve inherently complex profiles (e.g. medical treatments or
prescription drugs). Second, the single profile case method potentially yields more
information about underlying preferences. In models for the single profile case data
(Marley and Louviere, 2005; Marley et al., 2008), identified parameters convey whether
the level of one attribute is preferred to the level of a different attribute (e.g. $1100 of
salary vs excellent quality of care). In contrast, it is well-known that in models for multi-
profile case data, identified parameters only convey whether a change in one attribute
is preferred to a change in another attribute (e.g. increase in salary vs improvement in
the quality of care).
The uptake of the single profile case BWS has been slow relative to its potential
advantages. Somewhat surprisingly, this has been particularly true in health economics
which is likely to benefit more than other disciplines from using a cognitively easier
method (Flynn, 2010b). Most empirical studies still use multi-profile case DCEs, with
little acknowledgment of the availability of the single profile case method. One con-
tributing factor to this slow uptake may be the scarcity of empirical evidence to guide
an informed choice between the two approaches.
The survey of nursing students and new graduates we analyse is well-suited to
the objective of this paper. Nursing jobs are generally complex objects and many
attributes are required to describe their key aspects; here we use 12 attributes in total.
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In comparison, only 6 out of 148 DCE studies reviewed in de Bekker-Grob et al. (2012)
specify more than 10 attributes. Evidence suggests that the number of attributes is the
primary design dimension that influences respondents’ perceived complexity of DCE
tasks (Caussade et al., 2005). The use of a cognitively easier method, hence, can be
expected to have significant effects on respondent behaviour in the present analysis.
We specify a flexible choice model for each case, following the discrete mixture or
latent class approach (Train, 2008). This approach is an attractive one for analysing
two sets of preferences elicited by DCEs with different information processing require-
ments. Latent class models have been found to perform well in capturing key aspects of
preference heterogeneity in many choice data sets (Keane and Wasi, 2012), and various
heuristics in choice behaviour can be conceptualised as particular classes of preference
parameters (Hensher and Greene, 2010). In the multi-profile case analysis, the flexible
model’s kernel is the heteroskedastic rank-ordered logit (Hausman and Ruud, 1987),
and in the single profile case analysis, it is the max-diff logit (Marley and Louviere,
2005; Marley et al., 2008).
Our findings suggest that in comparison with the multi-profile case method, the
single profile case method elicits less noisy preferences. More importantly, the prefer-
ences are also structurally different. The key structural difference is that people value
salary gains more and non-salary gains less when completing the multi-profile case ex-
periment. To be specific, most of the utility coefficients on non-pecuniary attributes
are scaled up by a similar proportion as we move from the multi-profile case to the
single profile case estimates. In this regard, our results add to the existing empirical
evidence from Potoglou et al. (2011) and Flynn et al. (2013). However, we also find
that the utility coefficients on salary levels are scaled up by a much smaller proportion
than the coefficients on non-pecuniary attributes. This result is new and it is especially
important given the use of the coefficient on monetary attributes (i.e. the marginal
utility of money) to estimate the valuation of non-monetary goods and attributes.
Interestingly, we find little evidence that the variation in the amount of hypothetical
information to be processed drives this key discrepancy in elicited preferences. In
general, only a few studies (Flynn, 2010b; Flynn et al., 2013) discuss why the two
methods may elicit different preference structures, and no discussion is available on
specifically why the differential treatment of the pecuniary attribute may arise. We
place our findings in the context of related examples from experimental economics and
contingent valuation studies, and speculate on alternative driving factors some of which
are amenable to further investigation using more specialised survey designs.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the discrete
choice survey designs and estimation sample. Section 3 describes the main models to
be estimated. Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
We analyse discrete choice experiments collected as part of an ongoing longitudinal
study of nursing job choices described more fully in Doiron et al. (2011) and Kenny et
al. (2012). The data come from an online survey completed between September 2009
and September 2010. We recruited Bachelor of Nursing (BN) degree students enrolled
during 2008-2010 at two large Australian universities: the University of Technology
Sydney (UTS) located in a major city, and the University of New England (UNE)
in a regional centre. The sample includes nursing students in each year of the 3-
year BN program and new graduates (within 12 months since graduation). Nursing
students include school-leavers, mature age entry and other health-care workers seeking
to upgrade their qualifications. The sample covers a range of age groups, stages of
household formation and exposure to nursing work.
The 526 survey respondents (100 from UNE and 426 from UTS) represent 18% of
the BN enrolment at both universities during the recruitment period (19% at UNE,
18% at UTS). As discussed in Doiron et al. (2011), these response rates are similar
to comparable cohort studies. Also, based on available demographics, there are but
small differences between our cohort and all enrolled students. For more details on the
sample, see Doiron et al. (2011).
As well as answering standard survey questions on demographics and labour market
experiences, each of the 526 respondents participates in two different types of DCEs
involving hypothetical entry-level nursing jobs. Each job is described in terms of salary
and eleven non-salary attributes set at specific levels. The selection of attributes is
based on the literature on Magnet Hospitals in the US (Naude and McCabe, 2005;
Seago et al., 2001), and reflect characteristics that have been shown to influence the
quitting decision and job satisfaction of nurses. We use 4 different levels of salary and
2 different levels of each non-salary attribute as listed in Table 1. The salary levels
reflect those found in current entry-level nursing jobs in Australia. The feedback from
an earlier pilot study involving 60 students indicates that the attributes and levels are
appropriate in the context of the first job as a registered nurse in Australia.
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The first choice experiment is the single profile case best-worst scaling (BWS). As
shown in Figure 1, each scenario presents one hypothetical job and the respondent picks
its best and worst aspects. The second choice experiment is the multi-profile case BWS.
As shown in Figure 2, each scenario presents a choice set of three hypothetical jobs,
labelled Job A, B and C, and the respondent states which job is the best and which
job is the worst; all jobs are effectively ranked from most to least preferred.
Every respondent must complete 8 different scenarios of the single profile case BWS
before completing another 8 scenarios of the multi-profile case BWS. This presentation
sequence raises a concern that the comparability of preferences elicited by the two BWS
methods is affected by fatigue. An earlier analysis of the multi-profile case data (Doiron
et al, 2011), however, finds that the utility coefficients do not vary significantly over
the 8 scenarios. Moreover, our findings on the differences in the estimates between the
single and multi-profile cases do not support the wide-spread application of heuristic
decision rules in the multi-profile case tasks that one may expect in the presence of
respondent fatigue. We provide more details below.
We now discuss the optimality of designs underlying these two BWS experiments.
The scenarios for each experiment are constructed from an initial set of 16 jobs which
form a resolution 3 fractional factorial design. Initial sets for the two experiments use
different resolution 3 fractions, to ensure that no multi-profile case scenario includes a
job which the respondent has seen earlier in a profile case scenario.
For the single profile case experiment, the initial set of 16 jobs becomes the set
of 16 scenarios. The 16-scenario set is then divided into two 8-scenario subsets, and
every respondent is randomised to one of these two subsets. Street and Knox (2012)
show that our design performs as well as the complete factorial design in terms of the
D-criterion, when all coefficients in the standard max-diff model are equal.
For the multi-profile case experiment, each of the initial 16 jobs is augmented by a
pair of new jobs to form a scenario. The two new jobs in each scenario are determined
by the addition of two generators, chosen to make the resulting set of 16 scenarios
D-optimal when all coefficients in the standard multinomial logit model are zero. To
cover a larger proportion of the sample space, two different sets of 16 scenarios are
constructed in this manner using two different resolution 3 fractions. Each 16-scenario
set is then divided into two 8-scenario subsets, giving four 8-scenario subsets in total.
Every respondent is randomised to one of these four subsets.
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3 Model specification and selection
We begin by describing the basic notation used in the formulation of the choice models.
n = 1, . . . , N denotes a respondent; t = 1, . . . , T indexes a scenario; k = 1, . . . , K
indicates an attribute; lk = 1k, 2k, ..., Lk refers to a level of attribute k.
2 In our context,
N = 526, T = 8 and K = 12. Each profile or job j is described by the K attributes set
at specific levels. xlknjt is a zero-one variable which equals one if attribute k of profile j
shown to respondent n in scenario t is set at level lk.
The term “attribute-level” shall be used to describe the pair formed by an attribute
and one of its possible levels. For example, when the attribute of interest is the quality
of care which can be either poor or excellent, there are two possible attribute-levels:
poor quality of care and excellent quality of care.
We estimate discrete mixture (latent class) models which allow utility coefficients
to covary freely over a finite number of mass points (Train, 2008). These models are
well-suited to our objective of comparing preferences elicited by two different methods.
Keane and Wasi (2012) find that latent class logit models do well in summarising the
key aspects of preference heterogeneity in many discrete choice data sets.
3.1 Models for multi-profile case data
In our multi-profile case best-worst scaling (BWS) experiment, respondents choose the
best and the worst out of 3 jobs in each scenario. We thus obtain a full ranking of the
jobs. These data can be modelled using the rank-ordered logit (ROL) due to Beggs
et al. (1981). The modelling of complete rankings tend to result in smaller coefficient
estimates than the modelling of first-best choices only, as if residual variances increase
across preference ranks; Hausman and Ruud (1987) introduce the heteroskedastic ROL
(HROL) to address this issue.
With 8 scenarios completed by each person, our data also feature a panel dimen-
sion. In the (first-best) choice modelling literature, a random parameter or “mixed”
logit model (McFadden and Train, 2000) is often specified to address this dimension
by capturing within-person correlations in observations as well as between-people pref-
erence heterogeneity. The same approach can be adapted for the ROL framework as
demonstrated by Calfee et al. (2001) and Train (2008).
2For example, in the context of Table 1, attribute k may refer to hospital type, 1k and 2k being
public hospital and private hospital respectively. When attribute k refers to salary, 1k, 2k, 3k and 4k
are $800, $950, $1,100 and $1,250 respectively.
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We analyse our multi-profile case data using an extension of HROL developed in
Yoo (2012). The basic idea is to model all parameters in HROL as person-specific ran-
dom parameters. In this paper, we describe the resulting model from the conventional
perspective that rank heteroskedasticity arises as people are more certain about what
they like more (see for example, Fok et al, 2012). Alternatively, Yoo (2012) motivates
the use of the same model to account for stochastic misspecification of the microeco-
nomic random utility function (McFadden, 1981). Our discussion shows that the model
is an attractive tool regardless of the origin of rank heteroskedasticity.
Specifically, assume that respondent n ranks three available jobs in two statistically
independent steps indexed by r = 1, 2. In step 1, she picks the best of the three jobs.
In step 2, she eliminates her first-best from consideration, and picks the best of the
other two jobs. The best job in each step is the one that provides the highest utility.
The utility she derives from job j is decomposed into a systematic component asso-
ciated with attribute-levels and a random disturbance term.3 Specifically, for r = 1, 2
U rnjt =
K∑
k=1
Lk∑
lk=1k
Blkn x
lk
njt + u
r
njt =
K∑
k=1
Lk∑
lk=2k
βlkn x
lk
njt + u
r
njt = βn · xnjt + urnjt (1)
where u1njt and u
2
njt are independently extreme value distributed with variances equal
to pi2/6 and pi2/(σ2n6) respectively. B
lk
n measures person n’s utility of having attribute-
level lk and its scale has been implicitly normalised along with the variance of u
1
njt.
Because utility differences between jobs depend only on differences in the levels of job
attributes, the utility from each attribute’s first level is further normalised to 0, giving
identified parameters βlkn = B
lk
n − B1kn for lk = 2k, ..., Lk. In consequence, βlkn > βlln for
two different attributes k and l does not imply Blkn > B
ll
n . βn and xnjt are vectors of
identified parameters and attribute-level dummies, respectively.
Let Pnt(βn, σn) denote the likelihood of person n’s stated ranking in scenario t.
Once the utility parameters βn and the scale parameter σn are known, this likelihood
takes the HROL form. For instance, if person n has ranked the three available jobs as
3In revealed preference applications, such random disturbance term is often associated with at-
tributes which are known to the decision maker but unobserved by the researcher. In stated preference
applications, all attributes differentiating profiles are observed, and the disturbance term can be more
naturally interpreted as accounting for random fluctuations in the decision maker’s state of mind. See
McFadden (pp. 205-206, 1981) for a related discussion.
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1  2  3, this likelihood becomes:
Pnt(βn, σn) =
exp(βn · xn1t)
[
∑3
j=1 exp(βn · xnjt)]
× exp(σnβn · xn2t)
[
∑3
j=2 exp(σnβn · xnjt)]
(2)
where σn captures heteroskedasticity across steps in the ranking. This form of het-
eroskedasiticity may arise when people feel more certain about their more preferred
profiles, so that their first step response depends more on systematic parts of the utility
and less on random disturbances (Hausman and Ruud, 1987). σn would then lie in the
(0, 1) interval, unless person n ranks all jobs equally systematically (σn = 1) or picks
the second-best job arbitrarily (σn = 0). In this view, the coefficient attenuation issue
of standard ROL results from incorrectly constraining σn to 1.
To address the panel dimension of our data, we model βn and σn as random param-
eters in a latent class framework. Specifically, we assume that there are C distinct sets
or classes of utility and scale parameters. Since everyone in the same class has the same
parameters, we use βc and σc with c = 1, ..., C to denote the class-specific parameters.
The resulting “mixing” distribution is discrete, with ηc denoting the relative frequency
of class c in the respondent population. The final likelihood of respondent n’s sequence
of responses over the T scenarios is specified as:
Ln(β1, . . . ,βC ; η1, . . . , ηC ;σ1, . . . , σC) =
C∑
c=1
ηc
T∏
t=1
Pnt(βc, σc) (3)
where ηC = 1−
∑C−1
c=1 ηc. We call the model specification in equation (3) the latent class
HROL (LHROL). As summarised in Table 2, LHROL can nest several other modelling
approaches for rank-ordered data.
Our preferred LHROL incorporates 4 classes (C = 4). The estimation results are
discussed in Section 4, and presented in Table 3 of the Appendix. The preferred number
of classes has been chosen as in other empirical studies using latent class logit models
(Greene and Hensher, 2003; Train, 2008). Specifically, the 4-class LHROL specifica-
tion gave the smallest Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) among nine alternative
specifications with the number of classes varying from 2 to 10.4
4All specifications have included job-specific constants for Job A and Job B to capture potential
heuristics based on labelling; interestingly Class 4, which appears to rank profiles mainly in order of
salary levels, is also the only class in which these constants are significant at the 1% level.
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Table 2: Nested Models in LHROL - equation (3)
Parameter restrictions Special Cases
C = 1 HROL or heteroskedastic rank ordered logit
(Hausman and Ruud, 1987)
C = 1 & σc = 1 ROL or rank ordered logit
(Beggs et al., 1981)
C = 1 & σc = 0 MNL or multinomial logit
(McFadden, 1974)
C ≥ 2 & σc = 0, c = 1, . . . , C LCL or latent class logit
(Green and Hensher, 2003)
C ≥ 2 & σc = 1, c = 1, . . . , C LCROL or latent class rank ordered logit
(Train, 2008)
C = 2, β1 = β2, σ1 = 1 & σ2 = 0 LC-ROL or latent class rank ordered logit
(Fok et al., 2012)
The following summary of specification tests are based on the preferred 4-class
LHROL model. The scale parameter σc is statistically different from 1 at the 1%
level in all classes. The joint hypothesis of homogeneous ranking capabilities across all
classes, that is σ1 = σ2 = σ3 = σ4, is rejected at the 4.2% level based on a Wald test
statistic of 8.19. The parametric restrictions leading to LCL (σ1 = σ2 = σ3 = σ4 = 0)
and latent ROL (σ1 = σ2 = σ3 = σ4 = 1) are overwhelmingly rejected at the 1% level
using the likelihood ratio tests; the test statistics are 132.24 and 926.37 respectively.
3.2 Models for single profile case data
In each of our single profile case BWS scenarios, respondents examine one job described
by K different attributes set at specific levels, and pick the best and the worst of these
K attribute-levels. Marley and Louviere (2005) and Marley et al. (2008) develop
alternative models to analyse the resulting data. In particular, they prove a number
of choice theoretical properties of the maximum difference logit (max-diff) model, that
has since been the workhorse model in empirical studies (Flynn et al., 2007; Lusk and
Briggeman, 2009; Lusk and Natalie, 2009; Potoglou et al., 2011; Marti, 2012).
As Flynn et al. (2008) summarise, the max-diff model is operationalised by assuming
that an observed best-worst pair is the most preferred option out of K(K−1) mutually
exclusive options. These K(K − 1) options refer to all possible best-worst pairs of
attribute-levels given a profile, or job in our application. In the context of the object
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case BWS (Flynn, 2010b), which is like the single profile case BWS with only one
possible level per attribute, Lusk and Briggeman (2009) explicitly describe it as a form
of the latent dependent variable model.
We now extend the description of Lusk and Briggerman (2009) to the single profile
case BWS involving several possible levels per attribute. Let respondent n’s systematic
utility from an attribute-level be denoted Alkn .
5 Respondent n’s response to a profile
case scenario depends on the difference in utilities attainable from the candidate best
and worst attribute-levels; specifically, she maximises the difference (hence “max-diff”)
between the utility from the best and the worst attribute-levels. This utility difference
can be decomposed into systematic and random components.6 In the case where at-
tributes q and h form the candidate best-worst pair, the corresponding utility difference
D
{q,h}
nt is:
D
{q,h}
nt =
Lq∑
lq=1q
Lh∑
lh=1h
(Alqn − Alhn )xlqntxlhnt + e{q,h}nt (4)
=
Lq∑
lq=1q
Lh∑
lh=1h
(αlqn − αlhn )xlqntxlhnt + e{q,h}nt
where the error term e
{q,h}
nt is independently type I extreme value distributed. The
profile subscript j is dropped from attribute-level dummies xlknjt since only one profile
is shown in each scenario.
The utility difference between any two candidate best-worst pairs will be unchanged
when the same constant is added to each parameter Alkn . To achieve identification, one
utility parameter needs to be normalised to 0, say for the first level of the first attribute
A11n . Then, each identified parameter can be defined as α
lk
n = A
lk
n −A11n . Now αlkn > αlln
for two different attributes k and l implies Alkn > A
ll
n; recall that a similar statement
cannot be made in the context of equation (1). In this sense, with the single profile case
data, we can infer more about the underlying preferences than the multi-profile case
5We change the notation for utility weights from Blkn to A
lk
n to emphasise that their scale is nor-
malised with respect to potentially different residual variances. If the same set of primitive utility
weights are applied to comparing profiles in the multi-profile case and the best-worst pairs in the
single profile case, each Blkn would differ from A
lk
n by the same factor of proportionality.
6Following from footnote 3, the random component here can be interpreted as accounting for
fluctuations in the decision maker’s state of mind.
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data.7 Intuitively, K−1 more utility parameters can be identified with the single profile
case experiment because it elicits preferences over attribute-levels directly, whereas the
multi-profile case experiment elicits such preferences only to the extent that between-
profile variations in attributes’ levels affect the ranking of the profiles.
Let Fnt(αn) denote the likelihood of respondent n’s stated best-worst pair in scenario
t. Suppose that respondent n has picked q as best and h as worst. Once the identified
parameters, collected as vector αn, are known, this likelihood can be specified as:
Fnt(αn) =
exp(
∑Lq
lq=1q
∑Lh
lh=1h
(α
lq
n − αlhn )xlqntxlhnt)
[
∑K
k=1
∑K
l=1 exp(
∑Lk
lk=1k
∑Ll
ll=1l
(αlkn − αlln)xlkntxllnt)]−K
(5)
As in the multi-profile case analysis, the utility parameters are modelled as random
draws from a discrete distribution with C distinct classes, to capture inter-personal pref-
erence heterogeneity and intra-personal correlations in responses over T = 8 scenarios.
The final likelihood of respondent n’s sequence of responses is specified as a function of
the relative frequency of each class c, ρc, and the class-specific utility parameters, αc:
Ln(α1, . . . ,αC ; ρ1, . . . , ρC) =
C∑
c=1
ρc
T∏
t=1
Fnt(αc) (6)
where ρC = 1 −
∑C−1
c=1 ρc. We call the model specification in equation (6) the latent
class max-diff (LMD). LMD nests the standard max-diff model as a special case with
one class, C = 1.
Our preferred LMD has C = 7 classes. As we discuss in Section 3.3, the estimated
LMD parameters are transformed to make them comparable to the LHROL estimates.
The transformed results are discussed in Section 4 and presented in Table 4 of the Ap-
pendix. An earlier draft of this paper provides a summary of untransformed estimates
(p. 31, Yoo and Doiron, 2012). As in LHROL, the preferred number of classes has been
determined by examining which of 9 alternative specifications, with C varying from 2
to 10, led to the smallest BIC.
The postulated behaviour of the max-diff model may be unrealistic in the present
context, as it would have a respondent consider 132 (= 12×11) best-worst pairs in each
7We emphasise that this result holds not because the single profile case data allow identifying
the absolute level of the utility weight on each attribute-level; the identified parameter αlkn has been
explicitly normalised to represent the deviation of Alkn from A
11
n . This result holds because the iden-
tified parameters preserve enough information on the unidentified parameters to enable the ordinal
comparisons of utility weights on different attribute-levels.
14
scenario. For a sensitivity check, we have also estimated a latent class variant of the
sequential best-worst model (Marley and Louviere, 2005) which postulates a simpler
choice behaviour: a respondent looks for the best of 12 attribute-levels, and then the
worst among the other 11 attribute-levels in two statistically independent steps. This
alternative model, however, has a very similar likelihood as the workhorse max-diff
model, and leads to almost identical estimates; see our earlier draft (p.17, Yoo and
Doiron, 2012) for further comments. Our findings are in line with Flynn et al. (2008)
who also find the two behavioural models empirically comparable.
3.3 Normalisation convention
In LHROL (for multi-profile case data), the utility coefficient on one level of each
attribute is normalised to 0. An estimated coefficient measures how much utility changes
as the level of the relevant attribute changes from the omitted level to the reported level.
For example, the coefficient on excellent quality of care measures the utility difference
between excellent and poor qualities of care.
In LMD (for single profile case data), only the utility coefficient on the lowest
salary level, $800 per week, is normalised to 0. An estimated coefficient measures the
difference in utilities provided by the relevant attribute-level and the weekly salary of
$800, taking the positive (negative) sign when this attribute-level is (less) preferred
to $800. For example, the coefficient on excellent quality of care is positive when it
provides a higher utility than the weekly salary of $800.
Our analysis focuses on comparisons of the two sets of estimates. For this purpose,
the LMD coefficient estimates are transformed to represent the same information as
the LHROL estimates. Specifically, the LMD coefficient on a level of each attribute
is differenced with the LMD coefficient on the base level of the same attribute, where
the base level refers to the omitted level in the LHROL estimation. For example, we
difference the LMD coefficients on the excellent quality of care and the poor quality
of care to obtain a transformed coefficient, which can be compared with the LHROL
coefficient on the excellent quality of care. No transformation is required for salary, as
the LMD coefficients on salary levels have already been normalised as deviations from
the coefficient on $800, the omitted salary level in LHROL.
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4 Main findings8
As discussed earlier, one advantage of the single profile case best-worst scaling (BWS)
experiments over multi-profile case discrete choice experiments (DCEs) is that they yield
more information on the underlying preferences. Specifically, since the single profile
case BWS collects stated preferences over different attribute-levels directly, it allows
identification of parameters that indicate whether a level of one attribute is preferred
to a level of another attribute, instead of whether a level change in one attribute is
preferred to a level change in another attribute.
However, the two methods may also elicit structurally different information. We
begin this section by a discussion of hypotheses on potential differences in preference
parameters across the methods. Our reading of the few studies addressing this issue
suggests three broad possibilities. The first two relate to the ease of answering the
profile case and favour its use, while the third calls for discretion.
First, single profile case responses may be subject to less random noise. The re-
spondent may answer the profile case with greater certainty than the multi-profile case
since the former involves consideration of one instead of several hypothetical profiles
per scenario. Then, as initially envisioned by Flynn et al (2007), the single profile case
utility coefficients would be a scaled-up version of the multi-profile case coefficients due
to the smaller variance in the stochastic component. Without any structural shift in
preferences, the relative magnitude of the coefficients on two different attributes would
be the same across the two approaches.
Second, the single profile case task may be better understood and more attentively
completed. Flynn (2010b) anticipates that the single profile case would be especially
useful when the cognitive burden of processing multiple profiles is likely to be excessive.
Given the complexity of jobs generally, and our use of many attributes to describe the
hypothetical nursing jobs, the survey analysed in this paper provides a good example
of such a situation. It is an open question as to what kind of empirical differences the
varied cognitive burden may produce. A useful insight comes from a growing number
of traditional DCE studies on attribute non-attendance (Cameron and DeShazo, 2008;
Greene and Hensher, 2010; Hole, 2011). These studies suggest that people tend to
handle the cognitive burden of a choice task by ignoring a subset of presented attributes.
If an attribute is ignored in the more complex multi-profile case but taken into account
8All estimation results discussed in this section have been obtained using Stata 11.2/IC.
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in the simpler profile case, its coefficient would have a larger magnitude relative to other
coefficients in the latter case.
Third, single and multi-profile cases may elicit inherently different types of prefer-
ences. The single profile case asks respondents to state the best and worst attribute-
levels of a given profile, while the multi-profile case asks respondents to trade off at-
tributes across hypothetical profiles. Flynn (2010a; 2010b) and Flynn et al. (2013)
suggest that tradability alters the choice context and may affect the relative magni-
tudes of the coefficients.9 In our view, this is similar to effects from reference-dependent
preferences in the behavioral economics literature (Kahneman, 2003).
The two studies that provide an empirical comparison of the methods (Potoglou et
al., 2011; Flynn et al., 2013) find that the single profile case BWS and the multi-profile
case DCE primarily yield the first type of discrepancy; that is, the relative magnitudes
of the coefficients are preserved. In this sense, the preference structure is maintained
across the two methods. Importantly, these studies do not include a monetary attribute.
The discussion of our results begins with a brief summary of findings followed by
a more detailed presentation of the evidence. We start by examining to what extent
the qualitative conclusions of the earlier studies hold in our data. As the earlier two
studies, we find that most of the utility coefficients on non-salary attributes of the
nursing jobs are scaled up by a similar proportion as we move from the multi-profile
to the single profile case results. However, we also find that the utility coefficients on
the monetary attribute (salary) are scaled up by a much smaller proportion; that is,
respondents place a higher value on salary gains relative to improvements in other job
characteristics when completing the multi-profile task.
Is the different treatment of money driven by the varied cognitive burden? More
specifically, is the larger relative weight on the monetary attribute in the multi-profile
case due to respondents ranking jobs mainly in order of salary to simplify multi-profile
comparisons? Our results do not support this hypothesis. While one preference segment
(a latent class of respondents) in our multi-profile case data is consistent with such
behaviour, this segment is too small to explain the overall differences. The other classes
of respondents also reduce their relative valuation of salary in the profile case task.
Moreover, our analysis using an accept/reject DCE embedded at the end of each single
profile case scenario further rules out any explanation tied to the cognitive burden of
processing several profiles, as the estimates from this simple task are similar to those
9We thank an anonymous referee for the material on this point.
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from the more complex multi-profile case. (More details on this survey question are
provided below.)
The question then arises as to whether the two methods elicit different aspects of
preferences because the multi-profile case introduces tradability. While this possibility
is difficult to refute and provides a valid starting point for discussion, it does not
address the question of why salary is unlike other characteristics. We speculate on
more specific mechanisms by placing our findings in the context of related examples
from experimental economics and stated preference analyses.
4.1 Differential treatment of salary
As mentioned above, our results are comparable to previous studies for non-monetary
attributes in that most of the utility coefficients are scaled up by a similar proportion
as we move from the multi-profile case to the single profile case results. The different
treatment of money across the two methods is a new finding that went undetected in
the earlier studies as their profiles included only non-pecuniary attributes.
Our preferred panel data models are the latent class max-diff (LMD) with 7 classes
for the single profile case data and the latent class heteroskedastic rank-ordered logit
(LHROL) with 4 classes for the multi-profile case data. Utility coefficients vary across
classes in each model, and there is no exact correspondence between classes across
the two approaches. We average utility coefficients across classes within each model
using the class shares as weights, and analyse the resulting set of averages as summary
statistics for the preferences elicited by each method. Figure 3 plots the average LMD
coefficients against the corresponding average LHROL coefficients.10,11 All but one of
these averages are significant at the 1% level; the exception, the average LMD coefficient
on public hospital (public hosp), is significant at the 6% level.12
Figure 3 shows that differences between preferences elicited by the two methods
cannot be entirely explained by a shift in the error variance, capturing less random
noise in the profile case data. If they could, the points in this figure would be (1)
10Detailed estimates are available in the Appendix. Section 3.3 describes how the LMD coefficients
are transformed for comparability with the LHROL coefficients.
11An anonymous referee pointed out that the use of a bivariate plot to summarise the estimated
coefficients of two different choice models dates back to Swait and Louviere (1993).
12Our earlier draft (p. 21, Yoo and Doiron, 2012) presents the results from the simple max-diff and
HROL models that ignore unobserved heterogeneity. The results from these simple models closely
resemble those in Figure 3; the main difference is a decrease in scale which is expected since omitted
preference heterogeneity increases unexplained variances (Revelt and Train, 1998).
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Figure 3: single profile case vs multi-profile case coefficients
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located above the dotted line with unit slope, indicating that the LMD averages are
bigger than their LHROL counterparts and (2) clustered around a single steeper line
with slope representing the common proportion by which the LMD coefficients are
scaled up. Only the first pattern is observed.
Figure 3 also shows that the relative utility gains from two different non-salary
characteristics is much more robust across data sets than relative gains involving salary
and non-monetary characteristics. The bold line with the slope of 7.1 is the best fit
line through the origin and the average coefficients on non-salary attributes excluding
“public hospital”, the characteristic that is only marginally significant in LMD. These
averages are closely scattered around the bold line, whereas the average coefficients on
salary levels are located far below it. In fact, the salary coefficients are very closely
clustered around another line with slope equal to 3.5, suggesting that they are scaled
up by roughly half as much as the non-salary coefficients.
In other words, the respondents seem to value salary gains more in relative terms
when completing the multi-profile case than the single profile case. A key implication is
that the rankings of average utility gains from salary and other characteristics could be
reversed depending on which data set is analysed. The different treatment of salary, a
monetary attribute, is especially important given the use of willingness-to-pay measures
in applied work. The dollar valuation of improvement in a non-monetary attribute is
19
usually derived from a ratio of the utility coefficient on this attribute to the marginal
utility of money (the coefficient on salary). The slopes of the bold and dashed lines in
Figure 3 indicate that such dollar measures can double as we move from the multi-profile
to the single profile case.
4.2 Varied cognitive burden as a potential explanation
That respondents evaluate only one profile at a time has often been emphasised as a
potential advantage of the single profile case BWS (Flynn et al., 2007; Flynn, 2010a;
Flynn, 2010b; Potoglou et al., 2011; Marti, 2012). Is the greater valuation of salary in
the multi-profile case driven by the cognitive burden involved in the processing of several
profiles at once? We examine this possibility using two types of evidence. First, we
investigate if our results are consistent with a specific form of decision heuristic derived
from the growing literature on information processing strategies in DCEs (Cameron
and DeShazo, 2008; Greene and Hensher, 2010; Hole, 2011; Lagarde, 2013). Second,
we analyse data from a simple yes-or-no question which asks respondents whether they
would accept or reject a particular job. They are asked this question for each job
presented as a single profile case scenario (see Figure 1 for an example). Since this
accept/reject DCE involves only one hypothetical job at a time, and each of these jobs
is a single profile case scenario, we would expect the accept/reject DCE results to be
comparable to the single profile case results, based on the level of cognitive difficulty.
We now turn to the first set of findings. The hypothesis is that salary influences
multi-profile case responses to a greater extent because respondents rank jobs based
mostly on salary as a way of handling the extra cognitive burden. Note that the same
simplifying strategy cannot be applied in the single profile case, since salary must be
compared with at least one other attribute to state the best and worst aspects of a job.
Also, given our experimental design, each of three jobs in a multi-profile case scenario
offers a distinct salary level; hence, salary can always be used to rank the three jobs.
As detailed next, we do find a preference class in the multi-profile case data which is
consistent with such behaviour, and some evidence that people in this class pay more at-
tention to non-salary attributes during the single profile case experiment. However, this
class is too small to drive the overall result and we find that the relative undervaluation
of salary gains in the single profile case is a wide phenomenon found in all preference
classes. The finding requires more general explanations than a specific heuristic.
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Following Hensher and Greene (2010) who interpret heuristics as a particular form of
preferences, our analysis begins by examining whether a class with very large coefficients
on salary levels and small coefficients on non-salary attributes exists in LHROL (for
multi-profile case data), but not in LMD (for single profile case data).
Figure 4 displays the LHROL coefficients for its four preference classes. In each
panel, the horizontal axis labels attribute-levels and the vertical axis measures coeffi-
cient magnitudes.13 Class 4, albeit with a small share of the population at 14%, indeed
seems to capture individuals who rank jobs mainly in order of salary levels; we observe
very big spikes in the last three columns depicting the coefficients on salary levels $950,
$1100 and $1250, and much smaller bars in other columns. To aid interpretation, con-
sider someone in Class 4 who faces two jobs. Job I pays $800 per week (smallest in
our design) but has the best possible non-salary characteristics: excellent quality of
care, supportive management, and so on. Job II pays a higher salary but has the worst
possible non-salary characteristics. When job II pays $1250, this person has a 0.78
chance of choosing it. When job II pays $1100, she still has a 0.57 chance of choosing
it, despite disadvantages in all other aspects.
Figure 5 plots the LMD coefficients for its seven preference classes.14 The axes
of each panel convey the same information as before. There is no class which shows
extreme concerns for salary gains as LHROL Class 4 does. Most tellingly, Class 5 in the
LMD model is the only class that places the salary increase to $1250 above any other
non-pecuniary improvement. Yet, in the context of the earlier thought experiment,
even this class is more likely to choose Job I than Job II paying $1250; it can be easily
seen that the combined height of coefficients on non-pecuniary attributes easily exceeds
the height of the coefficient on $1250. More generally, only Class 6 with a population
share of 0.12 stands out in terms of likely information processing strategy. This class
has small coefficients on all attributes, suggestive of a large error variance, and may
capture people who expend minimal attention on the evaluation of a profile; with no
obvious rule to rank attributes of the same job, some people may give responses after
a very casual evaluation.
The evidence so far is consistent with the view that LHROL Class 4 captures people
who use salary to simplify the multi-profile case task. In our earlier draft (p. 26, Yoo
and Doiron, 2012), we complement this population-level analysis with an individual-
level analysis, which further suggests that the salary-focused respondents in the multi-
13Table 3 in the Appendix reports the estimates.
14Table 4 in the Appendix presents the estimates.
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Figure 4: LHROL coefficient estimates (multi-profile case data)
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Weighted average
profile case data have examined all attributes more attentively during the profile case
experiment. Briefly, we consider someone whose multi-profile case responses are best
described by LHROL Class 4, and ask which LMD classes best describe the same
person’s single profile case responses. Of 74 such individuals, only 18 are matched with
LMD Class 6.15
15For this purpose, we compute posterior class membership probabilities (p357, Train, 2009), and
match the person with the class giving the highest posterior probability in each model. Specifically,
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Figure 5: LMD coefficient estimates (single profile case data)
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Weighted average
suppose that there are C classes in total. Person n’s posterior probability of membership in class c is
given by φcLnc/(
∑C
k=1 φkLnk) where φk is the population share of class k and Lnk is the likelihood of
observing her sequence of choices given she is in class k.
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A broader comparison of preference classes in the two data sets suggests that the
relative undervaluation of salary gains in the single profile case is a wide phenomenon.
Figure 4 shows that LHROL Class 1 contains a majority (51%) of the population who
show no striking taste for a specific attribute. This majority class values the largest
salary increase (to $1250) more than any non-pecuniary gain, and the second largest
increase (to $1100) more than all but one of non-pecuniary gains. By contrast, Figure
5 shows that all LMD classes, excluding Class 5 with a 12% share, value many of non-
pecuniary gains more than such large salary gains. These results suggest that even
those who do not exploit salary as the primary job ranking criterion value salary gains
less during the single profile case experiment.
We now turn to the the second set of findings that incorporate data from a small
DCE presented at the end of each single profile case scenario. Specifically, the respon-
dent is asked to indicate if she is willing to accept the very job whose best and worst
aspects she has stated. Figure 1 shows an example. For anyone who has a view on what
kind of job is acceptable, this DCE should be considerably easier than the multi-profile
case experiment. The person need not process two extra jobs that vary over scenarios
and she only needs to consider if the job she has already evaluated provides at least
her own reservation utility. Whether her view is realistic or not influences this DCE’s
external validity, not its comparative ease over the multi-profile case experiment.16
We specify a random effects (RE) logit model of the accept/reject DCE outcome,
using job characteristics as regressors. The model intercept follows a normal distribu-
tion to accommodate interpersonal variations in the reservation utility or acceptability
threshold. Figure 6 plots the RE logit coefficients against the average LHROL coeffi-
cients.17 The two sets of coefficients are very similar in scale; they are closely clustered
around the best fit line from the origin that has the slope of 0.8.18
Most importantly, the RE logit and LHROL coefficients agree on how much the two
largest salary gains ($1100 and $1250) are valued relative to major non-salary deter-
minants of job choices: supportive management (supp mgt), excellent quality of care
16Nevertheless, the survey participants have considerable knowledge or at least strong beliefs regard-
ing entry level jobs for nurses. Many of them have worked as nursing aides and their program includes
a practicum where students get on-the-job experience. See Doiron et.al. (2011) for more details.
17In the RE logit, the intercept’s standard deviation and all slope coefficients are significant at the
1% level, except those on three clinical rotations (3 rotations), well equipped (well equip) and abundant
parking space (abund park).
18The same qualitative conclusion holds whether unobserved coefficient heterogeneity in the multi-
profile case data is modelled or not. When plotting the RE logit estimates against the simpler HROL
estimates, the best fit line yields a slope of 1.1.
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Figure 6: accept/reject DCE vs multi-profile case coefficients
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(excell care), encourage professional development (encourage) and appropriate respon-
sibility at work (app resp). Figure 6 indicates that any pair of these coefficients has
roughly the same ratio in the accept/reject DCE and the multi-profile case experiment.
These findings do not support the hypothesis that it is the extra cognitive burden in
the multi-profile case that led to the relative overvaluation of salary gains in Figure 3.
4.3 Other explanations
The preceding analysis suggests that justifications for greater preferences for salary
gains in the multi-profile case should go beyond the processing of larger amounts of
information. We close this section with a discussion of alternative explanations. Dis-
tinguishing among various behavioral hypotheses would require experiments specifically
designed for the task; we also offer a few thoughts on such possible experiments as future
avenues of research.
Flynn (2010b) is a rare study which explicitly speculates on why structural differ-
ences can be expected in the preferences elicited by the single and multi-profile case
methods. Our reading of his argument is that the two methods invoke different choice
contexts since attribute-levels are like tradable goods in the multi-profile case but not
in the single profile case. What is valued in the presence of tradability could be different
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from what is valued in the absence of it. Flynn et al. (2013) investigate this hypothesis
empirically in a health-related quality of life study with senior citizens, but as men-
tioned previously they find little evidence that the contextual variation influences the
relative valuation of different attributes. Using Flynn’s hypothesis to explain our find-
ings requires consideration of why tradability affects salary and non-salary attributes
to different extents.
The concept and importance of tradability may be related to reference-dependent
preferences in the area of behavioral economics (Kahneman, 2003). Evidence from
lab and field experiments shows that the point of reference influences the monetary
valuation of a good, sometimes with surprising results. People may have evaluated the
job in a single profile case scenario as the only offer in hand, whereas they are unlikely to
use as the point of reference any particular one of the three job offers that a multi-profile
case scenario presents. Once the job is perceived as given, the non-salary characteristics
could increase in monetary value.19 A test of this explanation could proceed with a
random allocation of two contextual prompts to single profile case respondents, which
would include one stating that the job is the only available offer and the other stating
that it is but one of several, and comparing the preferences elicited by each treatment
method with those elicited by the multi-profile case method.
An explanation more specific to our context is that the shift in preferences towards
non-salary attributes in the single profile case is due to the need for direct compar-
isons with salary. There is a social connotation associated with certain attributes (for
example, excellent quality of patient care) and several other non-salary characteristics
are related to a nurse’s ability to perform well in the job. Suppose for example that
a single profile case hospital has the reputation for an excellent quality of patient care
and pays $1250 per week. Even when the respondent regards such salary as the best
aspect, she may be hesitant about stating so, to avoid revealing that she places her
monetary rewards above the welfare of the patients. In the multi-profile case, because
the respondent chooses best and worst jobs which differ in several aspects, the monetary
value placed on non-monetary attributes is not so evident. The validity of this line of
explanation could be tested by comparing single and multi-profile case experiments on
objects with a price attribute and less pro-social elements, for example different knee
injury treatment options as in Bryan et al. (2000).
19This is an example of endowment effects. For a recent contribution to this literature, see Ericson
and Fuster (2011).
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Finally we note that our results are consistent with results from comparative studies
on willingness-to-pay (WTP) derived using multi-profile DCEs and different contingent
valuation methods. As summarised in Ryan and Watson (2009), a more direct elicita-
tion format tends to generate a smaller WTP for an intervention. Translated in terms
of our application, this means that a more direct elicitation format leads to a lower
dollar valuation of improvements in non-salary characteristics. The multi-profile case,
which prompts trading off attributes across profiles, is indeed a more direct way to elicit
how much salary gains a person is willing to forgo for a better non-salary characteristic;
the single profile case collects more primitive information on what attribute-level is pre-
ferred to another, which we then use to infer trade-offs. This aspect of the two cases can
also be seen from the need to transform the profile case parameters for comparability
with the multi-profile case parameters (see the earlier discussion in Section 3.3). To our
best knowledge, there are no behavioral explanations to date for these latter findings.
5 Conclusion
We have analysed stated preference data from two different discrete choice experiments
(DCEs): multi-profile case best-worst scaling (BWS) which, like traditional DCEs, in-
volves choices over several profiles, and single profile case BWS which involves choices
over attributes of a given profile. In our application, a profile is an entry-level nursing
job. That respondents need to process only one profile at a time, and may thus under-
stand single profile case tasks better, has been often advanced as an advantage of the
single profile BWS method. Also, the ability to identify additional utility parameters
can make the single profile case BWS a profitable alternative to multi-profile DCEs. For
example, in relation to our application, suppose that hospital managers are considering
how best to allocate a fixed budget to the design of new nursing jobs meant to attract
nurses away from non-nursing jobs. A relevant multi-profile DCE may be hard to de-
sign, because jobs in different occupations are best described by different attributes. A
single profile case BWS experiment would provide useful inputs by allowing inference of
attribute-levels which are more preferred than others, thereby highlighting key features
an attractive nursing job needs to possess.
We find that when restricting attention to non-pecuniary attributes, the relative
valuation of different non-pecuniary gains remains fairly stable across the two cases. In
contrast, the elicited preferences over gains in pecuniary (salary) and non-pecuniary at-
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tributes vary substantially, with the multi-profile case analysis indicating much stronger
preferences for pecuniary gains. Our results, however, show that the differential treat-
ment of salary requires explanations which go beyond different amounts of information
the respondents need to process in the two experiments. An economic analysis is mostly
concerned with objects which involve both pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects. In
this respect, our analysis suggests that if the single profile case BWS is to become a
broadly accepted method, empirical evidence from more specialised studies is needed to
inform why profile and multi-profile DCEs may elicit different preferences for the two
distinct aspects. It is hoped that our earlier discussion will provide a basis for future
research in this direction.
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Appendix
Table 3: LHROL estimation results (multi-profile case)
Weighted
Variable Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Average
Sal 950 0.574∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗ 0.300 2.332∗∗∗ 0.763∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.150) (0.336) (0.351) (0.080)
Sal 1100 0.961∗∗∗ 0.541∗∗∗ 0.116 4.141∗∗∗ 1.211∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.158) (0.277) (0.472) (0.098)
Sal 1250 1.093∗∗∗ 0.617∗∗∗ 0.653∗ 5.151∗∗∗ 1.495∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.176) (0.377) (0.502) (0.112)
Supp mgt 0.976∗∗∗ 1.161∗∗∗ 4.702∗∗∗ 0.778∗∗∗ 1.393∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.126) (0.965) (0.202) (0.106)
Excell care 0.450∗∗∗ 2.704∗∗∗ 1.775∗∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗ 1.154∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.229) (0.457) (0.130) (0.076)
App resp 0.479∗∗∗ 0.897∗∗∗ 1.080∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.652∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.122) (0.344) (0.153) (0.055)
Flex rost 0.804∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗ 0.473∗∗∗ 0.138 0.585∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.108) (0.160) (0.149) (0.043)
Encourage 0.585∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗ 1.683∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗ 0.664∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.104) (0.425) (0.138) (0.056)
Well equip 0.433∗∗∗ 0.626∗∗∗ 1.488∗∗∗ 0.262∗ 0.569∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.108) (0.492) (0.148) (0.063)
Well staff 0.413∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 0.730∗∗ 0.732∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.106) (0.284) (0.145) (0.047)
Public hosp 0.285∗∗∗ 0.127 0.795∗∗ 0.064 0.271∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.103) (0.391) (0.142) (0.054)
3 rotations 0.270∗∗∗ 0.115 1.035∗∗ 0.029 0.281∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.107) (0.415) (0.150) (0.058)
Flex hours 0.157∗∗∗ 0.152 -0.027 0.164 0.137∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.101) (0.129) (0.127) (0.038)
Abund park 0.129∗∗ 0.186∗ -0.049 0.145 0.126∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.098) (0.144) (0.140) (0.040)
Job B Cst 0.123∗ 0.054 -0.135 0.395∗∗ 0.117∗∗
(0.066) (0.113) (0.214) (0.173) (0.049)
Job A Cst 0.050 -0.291∗ -0.167 0.511∗∗∗ 0.009
(0.062) (0.154) (0.217) (0.169) (0.055)
σ 0.508∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗ 0.954∗∗∗ 0.675∗∗∗ 0.578∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.061) (0.230) (0.100) (0.038)
Class 0.513∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
share (0.034) (0.031) (0.020) (0.019)
Number of respondents 526 Log likelihood -5706.48
Number of observations 21040 BIC 11832.74
BIC refers to the Bayesian information criterion. Asymptotic standard
errors are in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ indicates that the parameter is significantly
different from zero at the 1% level, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10%.
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Table 4: Transformed LMD estimation results (single profile case)
Weighted
Variable Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5 Class 6 Class 7 Average
Sal 950 1.077∗ 4.913∗∗∗ 4.329∗∗∗ 0.810 4.868∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗ 4.034∗∗∗ 2.468∗∗∗
(0.622) (0.863) (0.888) (0.814) (0.476) (0.333) (1.074) (0.277)
Sal 1100 3.287∗∗∗ 6.278∗∗∗ 5.265∗∗∗ 3.496∗∗∗ 6.320∗∗∗ 2.981∗∗∗ 4.543∗∗∗ 4.278∗∗∗
(0.512) (0.680) (0.777) (0.569) (0.478) (0.342) (1.045) (0.217)
Sal 1250 3.785∗∗∗ 7.245∗∗∗ 6.773∗∗∗ 4.314∗∗∗ 8.454∗∗∗ 3.216∗∗∗ 6.110∗∗∗ 5.290∗∗∗
(0.511) (0.694) (0.726) (0.556) (0.914) (0.346) (0.968) (0.225)
Supp mgt 8.151∗∗∗ 6.830∗∗∗ 8.642∗∗∗ 11.581∗∗∗ 6.294∗∗∗ 2.328∗∗∗ 8.542∗∗∗ 7.934∗∗∗
(0.381) (0.568) (0.611) (0.418) (0.416) (0.289) (0.926) (0.199)
Excell care 10.904∗∗∗ 6.520∗∗∗ 7.187∗∗∗ 7.592∗∗∗ 4.582∗∗∗ 3.222∗∗∗ 8.087∗∗∗ 7.415∗∗∗
(0.424) (0.574) (0.602) (0.428) (0.414) (0.247) (0.929) (0.194)
App resp 3.455∗∗∗ 3.332∗∗∗ 5.522∗∗∗ 6.709∗∗∗ 3.987∗∗∗ 1.987∗∗∗ 6.872∗∗∗ 4.670∗∗∗
(0.474) (0.721) (0.675) (0.436) (0.406) (0.281) (0.940) (0.198)
Flex rost 5.230∗∗∗ 10.054∗∗∗ 5.874∗∗∗ 6.178∗∗∗ 5.070∗∗∗ 2.162∗∗∗ 6.921∗∗∗ 5.749∗∗∗
(0.425) (0.576) (0.701) (0.426) (0.420) (0.286) (0.863) (0.189)
Encourage 6.010∗∗∗ 4.548∗∗∗ 5.561∗∗∗ 6.321∗∗∗ 3.371∗∗∗ 2.025∗∗∗ 7.807∗∗∗ 5.352∗∗∗
(0.403) (0.648) (0.647) (0.447) (0.449) (0.274) (0.940) (0.189)
Well equip 6.266∗∗∗ 5.212∗∗∗ 5.915∗∗∗ 5.810∗∗∗ 3.255∗∗∗ 1.872∗∗∗ 7.298∗∗∗ 5.294∗∗∗
(0.393) (0.624) (0.677) (0.489) (0.459) (0.285) (0.852) (0.192)
Well staff 6.204∗∗∗ 3.647∗∗∗ 5.651∗∗∗ 6.510∗∗∗ 3.963∗∗∗ 1.772∗∗∗ 5.148∗∗∗ 5.051∗∗∗
(0.414) (0.901) (0.663) (0.426) (0.440) (0.292) (0.920) (0.192)
Public hosp 0.610 -0.945 1.246∗ 0.164 -0.017 -0.039 1.388∗ 0.392∗
(0.485) (0.659) (0.737) (0.505) (0.494) (0.265) (0.813) (0.208)
3 rotations 3.305∗∗∗ 4.792∗∗∗ 9.254∗∗∗ 4.600∗∗∗ 2.700∗∗∗ 0.815∗∗∗ 1.162 3.600∗∗∗
(0.463) (0.776) (0.596) (0.507) (0.539) (0.284) (0.836) (0.210)
Flex hours 2.557∗∗∗ 4.597∗∗∗ 0.468 2.011∗∗∗ 1.573∗∗∗ 0.309 6.475∗∗∗ 2.564∗∗∗
(0.481) (0.617) (0.872) (0.622) (0.501) (0.273) (1.041) (0.217)
Abund park 1.826∗∗∗ 1.732∗∗ 1.928∗∗∗ 1.370∗∗ 1.904∗∗∗ 0.880∗∗∗ 2.513∗∗∗ 1.721∗∗∗
(0.494) (0.759) (0.736) (0.597) (0.461) (0.270) (0.821) (0.214)
Class 0.234∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
share (0.024) (0.016) (0.017) (0.023) (0.018) (0.017) (0.025)
Number of respondents 526 Log likelihood -12261.59
Number of observations 555456 BIC 25657.208
The coefficients are transformed for an easier comparison with the results from the LHROL model; specif-
ically, coefficients are differenced with respect to the base level for each attribute. BIC refers to the
Bayesian information criterion. Asymptotic standard errors are in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ indicates that the
parameter is significantly different from zero at the 1% level, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10%.
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